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TOWARD INTERNATIONAL FREEDOM
OF RELIGION: A PROPOSAL FOR
CHANGE IN FCN TREATY PRACTICE
Since the founding of this nation, Americans have relied on fundamen-
tal constitutional principles for the ultimate protection of their religious
liberty.' These guarantees have been extended to all persons in the United
States, not just citizens.2 American nationals traveling or living abroad
may discover, however, that religious freedom is not regarded as a funda-
mental right elsewhere. 3 Although most nations do, at least in principle,
adhere to the basic idea of freedom of religious belief and exercise,4 reli-
gious freedom may be denied either to a state's own citizens or to foreign
nationals within its boundaries.
It is probably true that all states have, at one time or another, denied
liberty of conscience. Often public attention is not drawn to those claims
of denial of religious freedom which are settled through negotiation. Yet
this in no way decreases the impact on the individuals involved. For
example, although American military bases in Spain have chapels in
which religious services are allowed, until recently no marriages would be
recognized except those performed in accordance with the state religion of
Roman Catholicism. 5 Americans desiring to marry under other rites had
to leave Spain for the ceremony.6 When Italy discriminated against Amer-
1 U.S. CONST., amend. I.
2 As Mr. Justice Field stated in Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890):
The first amendment . . . was intended to allow every one under the
jurisdiction of the United States to entertain such notions respecting his
relations to his Maker and the duties they impose as may be approved
by his judgment and conscience, and to exhibit his sentiments in such
form of worship as he may think proper....
133 U.S. at 342 (emphasis added).
3 Perhaps the best evidence that denials of religious freedom still occur comes from
the fact that the United Nations is still trying to end such practices. See M. WHITE-
MAN, 13 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 671 (1963); 4 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE,
Nov., 1967, at 40; note by the Secretary-General: Elimination of All Forms of Re-
ligious Intolerance, U.N. Doc. A/7930 (1970).
4 See C. HYDE, I INTERNATIONAL LAW 707 (2d ed. 1945); A. KRISHNASWAMI, STUDY
OF DISCRIMINATION IN THE MATTER OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS AND PRACTICES, 37, in-
dexed as U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/200 (1959); Padelford, Religious Liberty in In-
ternational Law and Treaties, 21 INT'L REV. OF MISSIONS 402, 404 (1932).
5 This example is based upon personal knowledge acquired by the author while
stationed in Spain from 1969 through 1972. See also A Matter of One Hour, 117
AMERICA, Sept. 30, 1967, at 338.
6 This particular problem was apparently remedied through diplomatic negotiation.
The instance was not technically a denial of religious freedom but rather a licensing
problem. Interview with Richard D.S. Dixon, Capt. U.S. JAG Corps previously
stationed in Spain, in Ann Arbor, Michigan, Oct. 5, 1973. See A. KRISHNASWAMI,
supra note 3, at 46 (referring to the use of licensing requirements to restrict religious
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ican Jews immediately prior to World War II, all the United States gov-
ernment could do was to point to the religious freedom enjoyed by Ital-
ians in the United States and to suggest reciprocal treatment; no treaty
existed between the two countries. 7 Protection and regulation of foreign
missionary activities present additional international religious freedom
problems. 8 In some countries, unauthorized religious meetings may be
prohibited, and proselytizing may be cause for arrest. 9
In response to these and other difficulties, the United States has used
bilateral treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) in order
to guarantee religious freedom to Americans traveling or residing
abroad. 10 These treaties are concerned with protecting the rights of both
juridical and natural persons." Usually they contain a clause establishing
a reciprocal right of religious freedom for the nationals of the contracting
parties when they travel or reside in the other country's territory.'-
Should alleged denials of religious freedom occur, this clause serves as a
basis for negotiating a compromise settlement. Because religious freedom
practices). Indeed, there is now purportedly an allowance of religious freedom
granted by the Spanish Constitution and a complementary law. Religious Freedom
in Spain, 118 AMERICA, Jan. 13, 1968, at 38. Although a pertinent constitutional
amendment has been passed, a registration requirement for non-Roman Catholics
continues to make Protestants uneasy. Id. at 39. See also A Matter of One Hour, 117
AMERICA, Sept. 30, 1967, at 338; Religious Freedom in Spain, 117 AMERICA, July 15,
1967, at 47; Spanish Protestants Denounce New Freedom Law, 84 CHRISTIAN CEN-
TURY, July 12, 1967, at 885; 89 TIME, Mar. 3, 1967, at 37.
7 R. WILSON, UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
269 (1960). A similar situation arose in 1935 with Mexico. G. HACKWORTH, 3 DIGEST
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 647 (1941).
S In 1908, a group of Mormon Missionaries was expelled from Prussia, and the
United States made inquiries as to whether the expulsion was because of the mis-
sionaries' religious beliefs. G. HACKWORTH, 2 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 148
(1941). In 1923, the Haitian government asked the United States to stop sending any
missionaries, except Roman Catholics, to that country. The United States replied
that this would do violence to its own fundamental law guaranteeing freedom of
religious thought and belief. R. WILSON supra note 7, at 267. Problems also arose over
the regulation of foreign missionaries in Venezuela, during the early part of this
century, under that country's laws of ecclesiastical patronage. PAPERS RELATING TO
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE U.S.: 1914, 1099-1104 (1922). G. HACKWORTH, 2
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 149 (1941). In Turkey under the Ottoman Empire, a
United States protest was evoked when the government tried to restrict the activities
of American missionaries. C. HYDE, supra note 4, at 706.
9 As a contemporary matter, proselytizing in Turkey may be an offense. The hold-
ing of religious meetings in unauthorized places is forbidden. Interview with Captain
Burrus M. Carnahan, an Air Force JAG officer previously attached to a United
States military legal office in Turkey, in Ann Arbor, Michigan, Oct. 5, 1973. Earlier
restraints upon religious services occurred in Turkey in 1886. J. MOORE, 5 INTER-
NATIONAL LAW DIGEST 831 (1906).
10See M. WHITEMAN, 8 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 399-400 (1963); R. WIL-
SON, supra note 7, at 277; Walker, Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation, 42 MINN. L. REV. 805 (1958).
11 Walker, supra note 10, at 806.
12 See generally R. WILSON, supra note 7. Although Wilson describes various treaty
sources of religious freedom guarantees, this article examines only the FCN treaty
form since it dominates the field. The first such FCN treaty was concluded with
France in 1778. Wilson, A Decade of New Commercial Treaties, 50 AM. J. INT'L.
L. 927, 928 (1956).
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is not yet a customary right of all persons at international law, 13 the
FCN treaty clause on freedom of religion is the only binding basis for
protecting this fundamental right.1
4
Although FCN treaty clauses respecting freedom of religious practice
are useful, they offer considerably less than comprehensive protection.
The United States has FCN treaties with only forty-eight of the world's
approximately 144 independent states. This is, in part, due to difficulties
in drafting provisions acceptable to both parties.' 5 Even where treaty
clauses are in effect, certain denials of religious freedom persist and pre-
sent difficult remedial problems.16
Given the shortcomings of the FCN treaty as a protective device, a
general principle and customary right of religious freedom must be estab-
lished at international law. 7 The international legal status of the right to
religious freedom is uncertain, i8 despite seemingly wide acceptance of
the religious freedom principle evidenced by recent international insti-
tutional proclamations.' 9 Even the multilateral documents granting the
13 There is no explicit multinational recognition of religious freedom on a scale
as broad as the Universal Declaration would provide if it were binding law. W.
BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 469-70 (3d ed. 1971).
14 Walker, supra note 10, at 824.
15 In 1921, the United States and Mexico were attempting to draft a treaty which
contained a religious freedom clause. The Mexican Foreign Secretary described the
clause as "dangerous and unnecessary" because of the prevailing religious mood in
Mexico at the time. The Mexican Foreign Secretary also insisted that there was
already religious tolerance in Mexico. Subsequently, the treaty negotiations were
dropped. R. WILSON, supra note 7, at 264. In more recent times, the proposed 1955
FCN treaty with Haiti eventually had to be abandoned because an acceptable re-
ligious freedom clause could not be negotiated. Letter from Charles I. Bevans, Ass't
Legal Adviser, Dep't of State, to Bruce F. Howell, Jan. 2, 1974, on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform. See also R. WILSON, supra note 7, at
275. There was much dissent in the United States because of the lack of such a clause
even though the Department of State felt assured that no religious freedom would be
denied Americans in Haiti. Public Hearings Needed on Haitian Treaty, 78 CHRISTIAN
CENTURY, Jan. 18, 1956, at 68. This is also the tenor of a letter sent from the Depart-
ment of State to Senator Walter F. George, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, Feb. 16, 1955, on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform.
16 At the same time that Spain was refusing to recognize marriages not performed
according to Roman Catholic rites, the United States had an FCN treaty with Spain
containing a religious freedom clause. Treaty with Spain on Friendship and General
Relations, July 3, 1902, art. IV, 33 Stat. 2105 (1903), T.S. No. 422 (effective Apr. 14,
1903). Cf. Agreement with Spain on Friendship and Cooperation, Aug. 6, 1970,
[19701 21 U.S.T. 1677, T.I.A.S. No. 6924, which does not mention religious freedom.
17 "Customary, as distinguished from conventional, [i.e., treaty] international law
is based upon the common consent of nations extending over a period of time of
sufficient duration to cause it to become crystallized into a rule of conduct." G.
HACKWORTH, 1 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1941).
18 A. KRISHNASWAMI, supra note 4, at 7.
19 See, e.g., The American Convention on Human Rights, text at 65 AM. J. INT'L
L. 679 (1971); The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, text at 45 AM. J. INT'L L. SuPP. 24 (1951); The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, 3 U.N. GAOR, I, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). The
achievement of a fundamental freedom of religion without discrimination is also a
purpose expressed in the United Nations Charter. U.N. Charter art. I, para. 3. See
also the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, approved at Bogoti,
Colombia, in 1948; M. WHITEMAN, 5 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 231 (1963).
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right are without binding force, except for the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 20 In spite
of these limitations, these documents are considered evidence of a gen-
eral principle and customary right of religious freedom at international
law. 21 Though bilateral agreements, such as the FCN treaties of the
United States, bind solely the contracting parties, they constitute further
evidence of international custom. Additional agreements strengthen the
evidence that the right to religious freedom has become a customary right
at international law.
Given the vast differences in both juridical and theological thought, no
precise "international" definition of religious freedom is possible. However,
by comparing the meaning of religious freedom in American constitutional
law with the standards used in FCN treaties, this article analyzes the
scope of religious rights accorded to Americans by treaty. The FCN trea-
ties are also examined to determine their evidentiary value. Finally, a
model treaty provision, attempting to improve the utility of the FCN
treaty as an evidentiary and protective device, is proposed. Use of such
a treaty provision can hasten the elevation of religious freedom to the
status of a general principle and customary right of international law.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Americans derive their right to religious freedom from the first amend-
ment of the Constitution.2 2 While this right is fundamental, it is not
absolute. The Supreme Court has limited the free exercise of religious
belief when it contravenes public policy or presents a hazard to society.
In so doing, the Court has never explicitly defined "religion. 2 :3 The deci-
sions do, however, provide a guide, indicating what is allowed under the
rubric of "freedom of religion," while identifying actions contrary to public
policy.2 4 In order to provide a substantive legal background for consider-
ation of the religious freedom provisions in FCN treaties, the standard
20See E. STEIN & P. HAY, LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE ATLANTIC AREA 953
(1963). Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the German Federal Republic, Greece, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Turkey, and the
United Kingdom are parties. W. BISHOP, supra note 13, at 485, n.37.
21 The International Court of Justice uses as a source of law "international custom,
as evidence of a general practice accepted as law .... " I.C.J. STAT. art. 38, para. 1(b).
22 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof; .... U.S. CONST. amend. I.
23 The Court has gone so far as to discuss the propriety of practical adherence to
particular religious beliefs. See Yoder v. Wisconsin, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
24 Courts have explicitly considered the scope of the first amendment in cases like
People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (upheld the
use of peyote, an hallucinogenic drug, in certain religious services) and State v.
Massey, 229 N.C. 734, 51 S.E.2d 179, appeal dismissed sub nom. Bunn v. North
Carolina, 336 U.S. 942 (1949) (denied right to handle poisonous snakes in ceremonial
rites). Also, the Supreme Court has implied, in dictum, that the practice of religious
sacrifice would not be permitted. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1898).
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used by the Court to strike a balance between individual rights and the
public interest must be identified.
25
One of the first cases delineating the scope of the "free exercise" clause
was Reynolds v. United States.26 It was held that the "free exercise"
clause did not impair the constitutionality of a state criminal statute pro-
hibiting the Mormon practice of polygamy. The extent of the permissible
restraint was carefully defined. Although Congress was deprived of all
legislative power over mere opinion, it was allowed to control actions
which " .. . were in violation of social duties or subversive of good or-
der."'12 7 Thus, the Reynolds Court recognized that while a person is
free to hold whatever religious beliefs he desires, his expression of his
beliefs must be limited to activities not detrimental to the public weal.
In Prince v. Massachusetts,28 a state regulatory statute prohibiting cer-
tain uses of child labor was upheld in the face of a constitutional chal-
lenge based on a religious freedom claim. A Jehovah's Witness was con-
victed under the statute for directing her child to publicly sell religious
literature. The conviction was sustained despite the parent's protest that
such proselytizing efforts were essential to salvation.2 9 The Court held
that the state could limit parental freedom and authority in matters affect-
ing the child's welfare, including matters 'of conscience and religious con-
viction. 30 Once again, the power to act in accordance with the dictates
of one's religion was qualified.
New guidelines for applying restrictions under the "free exercise"
clause were developed in Cantwell v. Connecticut.31 Appellants in Cant-
well were convicted, inter alia, of violating a Connecticut statute which
made it illegal to solicit money, services, subscriptions, or anything of
value for an alleged religious cause without first obtaining the approval
of the Secretary of the Public Welfare Council. 32 The Court's opinion
explicitly noted that the first amendment guarantee of religious freedom
was a "fundamental" right applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment.33 The Court described the content of the first amendment:
[T]he Amendment embraces two concepts, freedom to believe
and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of
things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to reg-
ulation for the protection of society. The freedom to act must
25 For more general considerations of the scope of first amendment religious liberty
see Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REV. 327 (1969). See
also Gianella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment and Doctrinal Development: Part
1. The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381 (1967).
26 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
27 ld. at 164.
28 321 U.S. 158, rehearing denied, 321 U.S. 804 (1944).
29 Id. at 170.
30 Id. at 167.
31 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
32 Id. at 305.
33 Id. at 303.
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have appropriate definition to preserve the enforcement of that
protection. In every case the power to regulate must be so exer-
cised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe
the protected freedom.34
Later in the opinion, the Court identified what it considered to be per-
missible and impermissible restrictions under the "free exercise" clause.
If a clear and present danger of riot, disorder, or other threat to public
safety, peace or order existed the Court felt the state must have the
power to impose regulations. 35 The Court carefully noted, however, that
arbitrary exercise of restrictive power would be unconstitutional. Passing
on the statute's constitutionality, the Court stated:
[T]o condition the solicitation of aid for the perpetuation of
religious views or systems upon a license, the grant of which
rests in the exercise of a determination by state authority as to
what is a religious cause, is to lay a forbidden burden upon the
exercise of liberty protected by the Constitution.36
Thus, while limitations may be imposed on the exercise of religious free-
dom, the actual or potential application of such restrictions must not be
arbitrary.
The Supreme Court specifically expressed the proper scope of pro-
tection afforded by the religious freedom clause in Sherbert v. Verner.3 1
The plaintiff, a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, would not
work on Saturday, which is the Sabbath according to that faith. Because
she did not work on Saturday, the plaintiff was denied state unemploy-
ment compensation. Responding to this alleged denial of religious liberty,
the Court stated:
[I] n this highly sensitive constitutional area, '[o] nly the gravest
abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for per-
missible limitation .... ,3
This brief presentation of the history of the Supreme Court's attitude
toward the first amendment is sufficient to indicate that the Court would
look with great suspicion upon any restriction of religious liberty. The
right to religious freedom is fundamental to Americans and any regula-
tion purporting to limit it receives the greatest scrutiny. Yet the right is
not absolute. While one may believe whatever he will, actions in accor-
dance with that religious belief are subject to limits imposed by the so-
ciety in which he lives. Conduct which is objectionable, offensive, or
dangerous to the community is not free from justifiable restraint. Recog-
nition of this principle explains much of the difficulty associated with
defining a substantive right of religious freedom at international law. To
34 Id. at 303-04.
35 Id. at 308.
36 Id. at 307.
37 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
38 374 U.S. at 406 quoting from Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) (foot-
note omitted).
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the extent that religious and cultural factors vary more widely among
nations than within a single state, the difficulty in reaching a treaty accord
is significantly increased. Thus, American constitutional practice is merely
indicative of the general problem of balancing divergent interests. Yet
the American standard for religious freedom may serve as a referent in
judging United States treaty practice against the background of the differ-
ent and often competing interests of other treaty states.
II. EXISTING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CLAUSES
IN FCN TREATIES
Because of the necessary trade-offs at the negotiating table, United
States treaty practice often is not in accord with the American constitu-
tional formula for religious freedom. As a result, an FCN treaty may
have a detailed religious freedom clause or no such clause at all. Alter-
natively, negotiators may agree on a general clause stating a basic prin-
ciple and little else. This section examines the current FCN treaties of the
United States 39 in order to identify the types of clauses in use.
A. FCN Treaties Without Religious Freedom Clauses
The first type of treaty encountered is that which has no "freedom of
religion" clause at all.40 Although lacking a religious freedom clause,
these treaties enunciate the legal and economic rights of nationals of each
State while in the other's territory. 41 Where the applicable FCN treaty
does not contain a religious freedom clause, the United States lacks a
means by which to exert leverage in guaranteeing its nationals the right
of religious freedom while they are present in the territory of the other
39 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE (1973) [hereinafter cited
as TREATIES IN FORCE]. If a treaty is not in force but is cited merely for demonstrative
purposes, this will be noted.
40 See Agreement with Nepal relating to Friendship and Commerce, Apr. 25, 1947,
61 Stat. 2566 (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1585 (effective April 25, 1947); Agreement with
Yemen relating to Friendship and Commerce, May 4, 1946, 60 Stat. 1782 (1946),
T.I.A.S. No. 1535 (effective May 4, 1946); Treaty with Iraq on Commerce and Navi-
gation, Dec. 3, 1938, 54 Stat._1790 (1938), T.S. No. 960 (effective June 19, 1940);
General Treaty with Panama on Friendship and Cooperation, Mar. 2, 1936, 53 Stat.
1807 (1939), T.S. No. 945 (effective July 27, 1939); Provisional Agreement with
Saudi Arabia on Diplomatic and Consular Representation, Juridical Protection, Com-
merce and Navigation, Nov. 7, 1933, 48 Stat. 1826 (1933), E.A.S. 53 (effective Nov.
7, 1933); Convention with Switzerland on Friendship, Commerce and Extradition,
Nov. 25, 1850, 11 Stat. 587 (1855), T.S. No. 353 (effective Nov. 8, 1855); Treaty
with Brunei on Peace, Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, June 23, 1850, 10
Stat. 909, (1850) T.S. No. 33 (effective July 11, 1853).
See also Treaty with Morocco on Peace, Sept. 16, 1836, 8 Stat. 484 (1837), T.S. No.
244-2 (effective Jan. 28, 1837); Treaty with United Kingdom on Peace and Amity,
Dec. 24, 1814, 8 Stat. 218 (1841), T.S. No. 109 (effective Feb. 17, 1815).
Although these last two treaties are not technically FCN treaties, they apparently
are regarded as such. See Hynning, Treaty Law for the Private Practitioner, 23 U.
CHI. L. REV. 36 (1955).
41 Walker, supra note 10, at 806.
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State. Specific denials of religious liberty may not occur even in the ab-
sence of a religious freedom clause, but should such actions occur, the
United States government must look to other sources of international
obligation in seeking to afford relief to an aggrieved national. Fortu-
nately, treaties without a religious freedom clause are older in origin; none
have been concluded since 1947. They also comprise a minority of all
FCN treaties in force.
B. General Clauses
The inclusion of religious freedom clauses in FCN treaties became a
marked feature of American treaty practice during the nineteenth cen-
tury. One group of treaties concluded during this period contained clauses
guaranteeing religious liberty in broad general terms. The clause contained
in the 1832 FCN treaty with Chile is representative:
It is likewise agreed that the most perfect and entire security
of conscience shall be enjoyed by the citizens of both the con-
tracting parties in the countries subject to the jurisdiction of
the one and the other, without their being liable to be disturbed
or molested on account of their religious belief, so long as they
respect the laws and established usages of the country .... 42
Although the guarantees are not specific, the intent to create a right which
is inalienable may be discerned from the wording ". . . most perfect and
42 Treaty with Chile on Peace, Amity, Commerce and Navigation, May 16, 1832,
art. XI, 8 Stat. 434 (1834), T.S. No. 40 (effective Apr. 29, 1834). For identical
clauses see Treaty with Tonga on Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 2, 1886,
art. XIII, 25 Stat. 1440 (1888), T.S. No. 357 (effective Aug. 1, 1888) (All articles
except Article VI terminated July 28, 1920.); Treaty with Bolivia on Peace, Friend-
ship, Commerce and Navigation, May 13, 1858, art. XIV, 12 Stat. 1003 (1862), T.S.
No. 32 (effective Nov. 9, 1862); Treaty with Guatemala on Peace, Amity, Commerce
and Navigation, March 3, 1849, art. XIII, 10 Stat. 873 (1849), T.S. No. 149 (ef-
fective May 13, 1852) (Articles relating to commerce and navigation terminated
November 4, 1874. TREATIES IN FORCE, supra note 39, at 102.); Treaty with Ecuador
on Peace, Friendship, Navigation and Commerce, June 13, 1839, art. XIV, 8 Stat.
534 (1842), T.S. No. 76 (effective Apr. 19, 1842) (All articles with respect to com-
merce and navigation terminated August 25, 1892.); Treaty with Brazil on Peace,
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Dec. 12, 1828, art. XIII, 8 Stat. 390 (1829),
T.S. No. 34 (effective Dec. 12, 1828) (All articles except those of peace and friend-
ship terminated December 12, 1841. TREATIES IN FORCE, supra note 39, at 23).
A similar treaty clause may be found in the 1860 FCN treaty with Paraguay. Treaty
with Paraguay on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Feb. 4, 1859, art. XIV, 12
Stat. 1091 (1860), T.S. No. 272 (effective Mar. 7, 1860). However, the inclusion of
an additional modifying clause allowing the free exercise of religion distinguishes
the Paraguayan treaty.
The Spanish FCN Treaty is also a "general clause" treaty, but uses the following
language:
The citizens or subjects of each of the High Contracting Parties shall
enjoy in the territories of the other the right to exercise their worship
... subject to the Constitution, Laws and Regulations of the respective
countries.
Treaty with Spain on Friendship and General Relations, July 3, 1902, art. IV, 33 Stat.
2105 (1903), T.S. 422 (effective Apr. 14, 1903).
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entire security of conscience . . .,4 which describes the scope of the
freedom to be enjoyed. However, there is no mention of a right to wor-
ship or publicly practice one's religion. The only clause arguably protect-
ing conduct is the nebulous provision that nationals of the treaty parties
shall not be ". . . disturbed or molested on account of their religious be-
lief.. . ." In addition, the limiting phrase ".... so long as they respect the
laws and established usages of the country.. ." can be viewed as dis-
allowing any religious practice deviating from that prescribed by the state
religion. Thus, the extent to which religious freedom is protected by this
type of clause seemingly depends entirely on the internal laws of the
respective States. "Established usages" is a sufficiently amorphous term to
allow the application of almost any restriction on freedom of religion,
especially if the "usage" is reinforced by tradition. Reliance on a clause
of this type allows party States ample discretion to impose serious restric-
tions on the free exercise of religion.
C. Detailed Clauses
In contradistinction to treaties lacking a specific religious freedom clause
or granting protection in general terms, some treaties embody guarantees
of religious freedom in very detailed form. Most detailed clauses are
found in the FCN treaties concluded in the nineteenth century. One rea-
son for United States insistence on such detailed clauses was the desire to
protect the interests of American missionaries abroad. 44 The treaties
containing detailed clauses can be broken down by the format of the
clause. The initial "one paragraph" clause format is exemplified by the
1853 FCN treaty between the United States and Argentina.
They [nationals of either contracting party] shall not be dis-
turbed, molested nor annoyed in any manner on account of
their religiousbelief, nor in the proper exercise of their peculiar
worship, either within their own houses, or in their own
churches or chapels, which they shall be at liberty to build and
maintain, in convenient situations, to be approved of by the
local government, interfering in no way with, but respecting
the religion and customs of, the country in which they re-
side .... 45
43 Similar wording may be found in the 1782 treaty with the Netherlands and the
1785 treaty with Prussia. Treaty with the Netherlands on Peace and Commerce, Oct.
8, 1782, art. IV, 8 Stat. 32 (1789), T.S. No. 249 (effective Jan. 22, 1783); Treaty with
Prussia on Amity and Commerce, Sept. 10, 1785, art. XI, 8 Stat. 84 (1789), T.S. No.
292 (effective Oct., 1786). Both treaties are no longer in force. See W. MALLOY, 2
TREATIES, INTERNATIONAL ACTS, PROTOCOLS AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND OTHER POWERS (1776-1909) 1233, 1477 (1910).
44 R. WILSON, supra note 7, at 244, 276.
45 Treaty with Argentina on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, July 27, 1853,
art. XIII, para. 2, 10 Stat. 1005 (1853), T.S. No. 4 (effective Dec. 20, 1854). See also
Treaty with Costa Rica on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, July 10, 1851, art.
XII, 10 Stat. 916, (1852), T.S. No. 62 (effective May 26, 1852); Treaty with Colombia
on Peace, Amity, Navigation and Commerce, Dec. 12, 1846, art. XIV, 9 Stat. 881
(1846), T.S. No. 54 (effective June 10, 1846); Treaty with Venezuela on Peace, Friend-
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This provision basically allows nationals of each State to freely exercise
their beliefs while within each other's territory. The clause is detailed in
the sense that it goes further than merely granting religious freedom in
the abstract by specifying that religious groups are guaranteed certain
rights. 46 The only limitations placed on the practice of religion are that
buildings constructed for religious purposes be approved by the local
government 47 and that participants in worship services respect the "reli-
gion and customs" of the State in which they reside. Clauses in the trea-
ties with Venezuela, 48 Costa Rica,49 Colombia,50 and Mexico 51 also re-
quire religious adherents to respect the local laws and constitution of their
host State.
More recent detailed religious freedom clauses have been expressed in
a "two-paragraph" format. Articles I and V of the 1932 FCN treaty with
Norway are representative.
Article I
The nationals of each of the High Contracting Parties shall
be permitted; ... to exercise liberty of conscience and freedom
of worship; to engage in ... religious ... work of every kind
without interference; and generally to do anything incidental
to or necessary for the enjoyment of any of the foregoing priv-
ileges upon the same terms as nationals of the State of res-
idence or as nationals of the nation hereafter to be most favored
by it, submitting themselves to all local laws and regulations
duly established.
Article V
The nationals of each of the High Contracting Parties in
the exercise of the right of freedom of worship, within the ter-
ritories of the other, as hereinabove provided, may, without
annoyance or molestation of any kind by reason of their reli-
gious belief or otherwise, conduct services either within their
ship, Navigation and Commerce, Jan. 20, 1836, art. XIV, 8 Stat. 466 (1836), T.S. No.
366 (effective May 31, 1836); Treaty with Mexico on Amity, Commerce and Naviga-
tion, art. XV, Apr. 5, 1831, 8 Stat. 410 (1832), T.S. No. 203 (effective Apr. 5, 1832).
This treaty is no longer in force. W. MALLOY, 1 TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, INTERNA-
TIONAL ACTS, PROTOCOLS AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
OTHER POWERS (1776-1909) 1085 (1910).
46 Although many of these treaties also contain provisions on the religious burial
of the dead, this activity will not be dealt with here since the thrust of this paper is
freedom of conscience and religious worship.
47 This limitation contemplates that such structures shall be subject to housing
codes and other local regulations.
48Treaty with Venezuela on Peace, Friendship, Navigation and Commerce, Jan.
20, 1836, art. XIV, 8 Stat. 466 (1836), T.S. No. 366 (effective May 31, 1836).
49 Treaty with Costa Rica on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, July 10, 1851,
art. XII, 10 Stat. 916 (1852) T.S. No. 62 (effective May 26 1852).
50 Treaty with Columbia on Peace, Amity, Navigation and Commerce, Dec. 12,
1846, art. XIV, 9 Stat. 881 (1846), T.S. No. 54 (effective June 10, 1846).
51 Treaty with Mexico on Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 5, 1831, art.
XV, 8 Stat. 410, (1832), T.S. No. 203 (effective Apr. 5, 1832).
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own houses or within any appropriate buildings which they may
be at liberty to erect and maintain in convenient situations, pro-
vided their teachings or practices are not contrary to public
morals; ...52
Treaties employing this two-paragraph format were generally concluded
within a period of thirteen years during this century. 53 Typically, the
first article mentions religious rights in connection with the other civil
rights that may be exercised by the nationals of one State in the territories
of the other. The right to religious freedom is guaranteed, and any inci-
dental privileges or rights "necessary for the enjoyment" of religious free-
dom are allowed on the basis of national or most-favored-nation treat-
ment. The clause requires submission to local laws and regulations "duly
established," a phrase which conveys a concept akin to due process,
though seemingly more amorphous. 54 The use of buildings for religious
purposes is allowed, either through ownership or lease.55
The second article is the specific "religious worship" clause.50 Liberty
to worship is accorded nationals of a treaty party in the territories of the
contracting host state. Both public and private worship services are per-
mitted. Additional reference is made to the right to erect and maintain
52 Treaty with Norway on Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights, June 5,
1924, arts. I & V, 47 Stat. 2135 (1932), T.S. No. 852 (effective Sept. 13, 1927); Treaty
with Liberia on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Aug. 8, 1938, arts. I & V, 54
Stat. 1739 (1939), T.S. No. 956 (effective Nov. 21, 1939); Treaty with Finland on
Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights, Feb. 13, 1934, arts. I & V, 49 Stat. 2659
(1934), T.S. No. 868 (effective Aug. 10, 1934); Treaty with Austria on Friendship,
Commerce and Consular Relations, June 19, 1928, arts. I & V, 47 Stat. 1899 (1931),
T.S. No. 839 (effective May 27, 1931); Treaty with Latvia on Friendship, Commerce
and Consular Rights, Apr. 20, 1928, arts. I & V, 45 Stat. 2641 (1928), T.S. No. 765,
(effective July 25, 1928). This treaty, as well as the one with Estonia, is still con-
sidered in force by the United States. TREATIES IN FORCE, supra note 39 at 148;
Treaty with Honduras on Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights, Dec. 7, 1927,
arts. I & V, 45 Stat. 2618 (1928), T.S. No. 764 (effective July 19, 1928); Treaty with
Estonia on Friendship, Commerce and Consular Relations, Dec. 23, 1925, arts. I &
V, 44 Stat. 2379 (1926), T.S. No. 736 (effective May 22, 1926); Treaty with Germany
on Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights, Dec. 8, 1923, 44 Stat. 2132 (1925),
T.S. No. 725 (effective Oct. 14, 1925). This treaty has been superseded by the 1954
agreement. See Treaty with Germany on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Oct.
29, 1954, [19561 art. II, para. 3, 7 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593.
53 These treaties were concluded in the period from 1925 to 1938. If the Chinese
and Italian treaties of 1946 and 1948 are included, the period is increased to 23
years. Treaty with China on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 4, 1946,
art. XII, 63 Stat. 1299 (1949), T.I.A.S. No. 1871 effective Nov. 30, 1948; Treaty with
Italy on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Feb. 2, 1948, art. I, para. 2, & art.
XI, 63 Stat. 2255 (1949), T.I.A.S. No. 1965 effective July 26, 1949.
54 The Finnish treaty is the only treaty that omits the phrase "duly established."
Treaty with Finland on Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights, Feb. 13, 1934,
arts. I & V, 49 Stat. 2659, (1934), T.S. No. 868 (effective Aug. 10, 1934).
55 The Austrian clause establishes the right on a "national treatment" basis. Treaty
with Austria on Friendship, Commerce and Consular Relations, June 19, 1928, arts.
I & V, 47 Stat. 1876 (1931), T.S. No. 839 (effective May 27, 1931).
56 The Finnish treaty adds "liberty of conscience" to this clause. Treaty with Fin-
land on Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights, Feb. 13, 1934, arts. I & V, 49
Stat. 2659 (1934), T.S. No. 868 (effective Aug. 10, 1934).
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buildings for religious purposes. The only limitation imposed on religious
practices is that they may not be "contrary to public order or public
morals." 57
Two recent treaties are worth noting because of their incorporation of
additional significant wording into the basic detailed clause. Such a clause
is found in the 1946 FCN treaty with China:
The nationals of either High Contracting Party shall, through-
out the territories of the other High Contracting Party, be
permitted to exercise liberty of conscience and freedom of wor-
ship and ,to establish schools for the education of their children,
and they may, whether individually, collectively or in religious
or educational corporations or associations, and without annoy-
ance or molestation of any kind by reason of their religious
belief or otherwise, conduct religious services and give religious
or other instruction, either within their own houses or within
any other appropriate buildings, provided that their religious
and educational activities are not contrary to public morals and
that their educational activities are conducted in conformity with
the applicable laws and regulations, if any, which are or may
hereafter be enforced by the duly constituted authorities. " 8
57 The treaties with Estonia and Latvia employ both terms. Treaty with Estonia
on Friendship, Commerce and Consular Relations, Dec. 23, 1925, arts. I & V, 44
Stat. 2379 (1926), T.S. No. 736 (effective May 22, 1926); Treaty with Latvia on
Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights, Apr. 20, 1928, arts. I & V, 45 Stat.
2641 (1928), T.S. No. 765, (effective July 25, 1928). The Austrian treaty uses both
terms and the phrase ". . . provided further [that] they conform to all laws and regu-
lations duly established in these territories; .. ." Treaty with Austria on Friendship,
Commerce and Consular Relations, June 19, 1928, arts. I & V, 47 Stat. 1876 (1931),
T.S. No. 839 (effective May 27, 1931).
58 Treaty with China on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 4, 1946, art.
XII, 63 Stat. 1299 (1949), T.I.A.S. No. 1871 (effective Nov. 30, 1948). A similar clause
is found in the 1948 treaty with Italy:
Article I
2. The nationals of either High Contracting Party shall, within the
territories of the other High Contracting Party, be permitted, without
interference, to exercise, in conformity with the applicable laws and
regulations, the following rights and privileges upon terms no less
favorable than those now or hereafter accorded to nationals of such
other High Contracting Party:
(a) to engage in . . . religious . . . activities .
(b) to acquire, own, erect or lease, and occupy appropriate buildings,
and to lease appropriate lands, for ... religious .. purposes; ....
Article X1
1. The nationals of either High Contracting Party shall, within the
territories of the other High Contracting Party, be permitted to exercise
liberty of conscience and freedom of worship, and they may, whether
individually, collectively or in religious corporations or associations,
and without annoyance or molestation of any kind by reason of their
religious belief, conduct services, either within their own houses or
within any other appropriate buildings, provided that their teachings
or practices are not contrary to public morals or public order.
Treaty with Italy on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Feb. 2, 1948, art I,
para. 2, & art. XI, para. 1, 63 Stat. 2255 (1949), T.I.A.S. No. 1965 effective July 26,
1949.
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Although similar in detail to the one and two paragraph formats, these
new treaties protect collective as well as individual worship, thus avoiding
right of assembly problems arising from large group meetings. The Chi-
nese treaty also addresses the idea of religious education. The
addition of these concepts makes the Chinese treaty clause somewhat
aberrational. Yet, viewed in the context of the other detailed clauses, it
represents another facet of the effort to specify the nature and scope of
protected religious freedom.
D. Recent Abbreviated Clauses
Since 1950, the prevalent language of religious freedom clauses in
FCN treaties has become more abbreviated. 59 The nature of the artic-
ulated protection falls in between the general and the detailed coverage
in other treaties. These "abbreviated" clauses take two forms. Since both
forms provide essentially the same coverage, only the two-paragraph for-
mat is considered here.60 This type of clause is incorporated in the 1962
FCN treaty with Belgium:
Article H
3. Nationals of either Party, within the territories of the
other Party, shall enjoy freedom of conscience; and they shall
be at liberty to hold religious services, both public and private,
at suitable places of their choice.
5. The provisions of the present Article shall be subject to
the right of either party to apply measures that are necessary to
maintain public order and protect the public health, morals
and safety. 61
59 Wilson, supra note 12, at 930. This brevity can perhaps be traced to the desire
to avoid any undue interpretive difficulties should a negotiation situation arise.
60 Examples of the "one-clause" format are found in the following treaties. Treaty
with Thailand on Amity and Economic Relations, May 29, 1966, [1968] art. I, para. 3,
19 U.S.T. 5843, T.I.A.S. No. 6540; Treaty with Togo on Amity and Economic Re-
lations, Feb. 8, 1966, [1967] art. II, para. 2, 18 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 6193; Treaty
with Vietnam on Amity and Economic Relations, Apr. 3, 1961, [1961] art. I, para. 3,
12 U.S.T. 1703, T.I.A.S. 4890; Treaty with Oman on Amity, Economic Relations and
Consular Rights, Dec. 20, 1958, [1960] art. II, para. 3, 11 U.S.T. 1835, T.I.A.S. No.
4530; Treaty with Germany on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 29, 1954,
[1956] art. II, para. 3, 7 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593; Treaty with Ethiopia on
Amity and Economic Relations, Sept. 7, 1951, [1953] art. VI, para. 3, 4 U.S.T. 2134,
T.I.A.S. No. 2864.
61 Treaty with Belgium on Friendship, Establishment and Navigation, May 23,
1962, [1962] art. II, paras. 3 & 5, 14 U.S.T. 1284, T.I.A.S. No. 5432. Similar pro-
visions may be found in the following treaties. Treaty with Luxembourg on Friend-
ship, Establishment and Navigation, Feb. 23, 1962, [1963] art. II, paras. 3 & 5, 14
U.S.T. 251, T.I.A.S. No. 5306; Treaty with Pakistan on Friendship and Commerce,
Nov. 12, 1959, [1961] art. II, paras. 2 & 3, 12 U.S.T. 110, T.I.A.S. No. 4683; Treaty
with Denmark on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 1, 1951, [1961] art.
II, paras. 2 & 3, 12 U.S.T. 908, T.I.A.S. No. 4797; Convention with France on
Establishment, Protocol and Declaration, Nov. 25, 1959, [1960] art. II, paras. 2 & 3,
11 U.S.T. 2398, T.I.A.S. No. 4625; Treaty with Nicaragua on Friendship, Commerce,
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In essence, these provisions allow religious liberty with respect to freedom
of conscience and the right to hold religious services in public and private.
The only limitation placed on these rights is that they may be regulated
so as not to contravene public order or the interests of public health,
morals, and safety. The FCN treaties with Belgium 62 and Luxembourg63
are the only ones to use the phrase ". . . at suitable places of their
choice . . ." in describing where religion may be practiced. 64
This examination of the history of United States FCN treaty practice
reveals a governmental inclination to insert clauses guaranteeing religious
freedom to United States nationals traveling or residing in a foreign state.
The grant of protection may be either general or specific, and in recently
concluded treaties a synthesis of the two approaches may have come
about. The efficacy of the United States' treaty policy must be evaluated
in this historical setting.
III. POLICIES SHAPING THE USE
OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CLAUSES
The policy of the Department of State is to negotiate FCN treaties con-
taining clauses guaranteeing the right of religious freedom to U.S. nation-
als abroad.65 Yet, as has been demonstrated, the specificity of the guar-
antee may differ from treaty to treaty.66 This nonuniformity of language
is attributable to the necessity for compromise in treaty negotiations.
Compromise is required because deference must be given to the interests
of the other contracting party. A state may resist granting a broad right
of religious freedom, fearing that condonation of other religious practices
Navigation and Protocol, Jan. 21, 1956, [1958] art. II, paras. 2 & 4, 9 U.S.T. 449,
T.I.A.S. No. 4024; Treaty with Korea on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation,
Nov. 28, 1956, [1957] art. II, paras. 2 & 3, 8 U.S.T. 2217, T.I.A.S. No. 3947; Treaty
with the Netherlands on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Mar. 27, 1946,
[1957] art. II, paras. 3 & 4, 8 U.S.T. 2043, T.I.A.S. No. 3942; Treaty with Iran on
Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights, Aug. 15, 1955, [19571 art. II,
paras. 2 & 3, 8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853; Treaty with Israel on Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation, Aug. 23, 1951, [1954] art. II, paras. 2 & 3, 5 U.S.T.
550, T.I.A.S. No. 2948; Treaty with Greece on Friendship, Commerce and Naviga-
gation, Aug. 3, 1951, [1954] art. III, paras. 2 & 3, 5 U.S.T. 1829, T.I.A.S. No. 3057;
Treaty with Japan on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, [1953]
art. I, paras. I & 3, 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863; Treaty with Ireland on Friend-
ship, Commerce and Navigation, Jan. 21, A9-50, [1950] art. I, paras. 2 & 3, 1 U.S.T.
785, T.I.A.S. No. 2155.
62 Treaty with Belgium on Friendship, Establishment, and Navigation, May 23,
1962, [1963] art. II, paras. 3 & 5, 14 U.S.T. 1284, T.I.A.S. No. 5432.
63 Treaty with Luxembourg on Friendship, Establishment and Navigation, Feb. 23,
1962, [1963] art. II, paras. 3 & 5, 14 U.S.T. 251, T.I.A.S. No. 5306.
64 The other clauses listed do not mention this aspect of the right to worship. The
treaty with Greece uses the phrase ". . . to hold religious ceremonies under the pro-
tection of law." Treaty with Greece on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Aug.
3, 1951, [1954] art. III, para. 1, 5 U.S.T. 1829, T.I.A.S. No. 3057.
65 G. HACKWORTH, supra note 8, at 149-50, quoting a 1911 letter from the Depart-
ment of State to its Charg6 d'Affaires in Venezuela.
66 See part II supra.
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will lead to adulteration of established religions. In addition, the grant of
such a treaty right could conceivably threaten state security by authoriz-
ing undue foreign intervention in internal affairs.6 7 The practice of pros-
elytizing is particularly suspect, since it raises the specter of colonialist
intervention .6  Fear of foreign intervention is especially prevalent in
developing nations because these countries have borne the brunt of mis-
sionary activity in the past and are still not sufficiently stable, econom-
ically or politically, to permit extensive outside interference in their inter-
nal affairs.
More developed nations argue that no religious freedom clause is
needed if the host country provides for such a right by custom, law, or
constitution. In these cases, insistence upon the inclusion of a religious
freedom clause in an FCN treaty would be an affront to the integrity of
the other State. Regardless of the status of the contracting party, the
treaty drafters must decide whether the right to religious freedom should
encompass more than the right to hold beliefs and practice them pri-
vately.
Treaties concluded after 1950 seem to abandon any sort of detailed
construction in favor of a general statement characterizing religious liberty
as a fundamental right. This pattern may evidence recognition by the
party states that the majority of nations allow religious freedom, thus
obviating the need for specific protective wording. 9 The limitation of
regulations to those ". . . measures that are necessary to maintain public
order and protect the public health, morals and safety ... ,,7 seems more
consonant with American constitutional guidelines71 than does the former
language which subjected religious practices to "laws and established us-
ages. ' '7 2 Finally, there is increased use of language permitting religious
worship ". . . either individually or through associations . .. 73 which may
be construed to demonstrate the United States' desire to protect the asso-
ciational rights of religious freedom. Thus, the United States now seems
to be advancing a treaty standard designed to guarantee Americans reli-
gious freedom abroad, but the operative language is more general than
that contained in prior treaties.
67 This is the Indian position. It has been said that the extensive clauses found in
the Treaty of Berlin of 1879 presented the opportunity for other powers to intervene
in Balkan affairs on numerous occasions. Padelford, supra note 4, at 410.
68 4 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Dec., 1967, at 84. This is the expressed attitude
of Dahomey, Sierra Leone, Lesotho, Ghana, and Pakistan as of 1967. Id. at 84-85.
69 Conspicuously absent is specific mention of such practices as owning or leasing
religious buildings and terms allowing religious practice ". . . without annoyance or
molestation of any kind .... See also Treaty with Norway on Friendship, Com-
merce and Consular Rights, June 5, 1924, arts. I & V, 47 Stat. 2135, T.S. No. 852
(effective Sept. 13, 1927).
70Treaty with Japan on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953,
[1953] art. I, para. 3, 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863.
71 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
72 Treaty with Chile on Peace, Amity, Commerce and Navigation, May 16, 1832,
art. XI, 8 Stat. 434 (1839), T.S. No. 40 (effective Apr. 29, 1834).
73 Treaty with Oman on Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights, Dec.
20, 1958, [19601 art. II, para. 3, 11 U.S.T. 1835, T.I.A.S. No. 4530.
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The problem with this standard is that the wording may at times be too
general to offer viable protection to American nationals in the event of
specific attempts to restrict their right of religious freedom. For example,
the 1966 FCN treaty with Thailand allows religious practices ".. . subject
to applicable laws, ordinances and regulations.. ."7 This phrasing does
not convey the idea that religious freedom is a fundamental right as
strongly as would wording subjecting religious exercise to ". . . measures
that are necessary to protect . . ." the public weal. 75 Although the Thai
treaty does assert the right to worship in public and private,7 6 questions
remain about the permissible types of regulations and the limits to the
freedoms guaranteed. The wording of the religious freedom clause would
apparently not comport with the reasoning of Cantwell v. Connecticut,77
in which the Supreme Court refused to allow regulation of religious
practices to fall within the unfettered discretion of public officials.
The use of national or most-favored-nation treatment in religion clauses
has been abandoned in post-1950 treaties.7 8 The lack of a national treat-
ment standard permits the host state to apply different standards to aliens
than to its own nationals, conceivably di--criminating against the former,
especially in the licensing of religious buildings or associations.7 9 The
lack of a most-favored-nation standard eliminates the possibility that a
subsequent treaty with a third party could grant additional rights under
an existing clause. Also lost is the additional pressure that could be
brought to bear by another State if negotiations should arise concerning
treaty interpretation or application.
Despite the post-1950 trend toward use of general wording in religious
freedom clauses, American policy with regard to obtaining such treaty
guarantees has purportedly remained unchanged. Yet, active pursuance
of that policy has been tempered by the realization that potential party
states have valid interests to protect in limiting the scope of the right ex-
74 Treaty with Thailand on Amity and Economic Relations, May 29, 1966, [1968]
art. I, para. 3, 19 U.S.T. 5843, T.I.A.S. No. 6540.
75 Treaty with Luxembourg on Friendship, Establishment and Navigation, Feb. 23,
1962, [19631 art. II, paras. 3 & 5, 14 U.S.T. 251, T.I.A.S. No. 5306 (emphasis added).
Indeed, the Uruguay treaty of 1949, which never entered into force, used the phrase
"... necessary to maintain public order and necessary to protect the public health,
morals and safety." (emphasis added). R. WILSON, supra note 7, at 271. See also
treaty with Belgium on Friendship, Establishment and Navigation, May 23, 1962,
[1962] art. II, paras. 3 & 5, 14 U.S.T. 1284, T.I.A.S. No. 5432.
76 Treaty with Thailand on Amity and Economic Relations, May 29, 1966, [1968]
art. I, para. 3, 19 U.S.T. 5843, T.I.A.S. No. 6540.
77 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
78 Treaty with Norway on Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights, June 5,
1924, arts. I & V, 47 Stat. 2135 (1932), T.S. No. 852 (effective Sept. 13, 1927). A
"most favored nation" clause may be conditional or unconditional. In 1923, the
United States adopted the latter for commercial treaties. W. BISHOP, supra note 13,
at 159. This clause grants a privilege to the treaty party to the same extent to which
the privilege is granted to any third State. National treatment, on the other hand,
allows privileges to the extent nationals of the host country enjoy them.
79 Cf. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (alienage a suspect classi-
fication).
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tended. Thus, even though the United States desires full religious liberties
for its nationals, the State Department recognizes that it can not always
insist upon religious freedom as a specifically delineated right and realizes
that, in some instances, it must be content with the protection afforded by
existing local and international law. Also, in treaty negotiation, trade-offs
can occur between proposed provisions. Often a religious freedom clause
must be sacrificed in order for the treaty to be accepted or to obtain
other desirable provisions."0 Because of these factors the United States
will, at times, have no choice but to drop its insistence on the inclusion of
a religious freedom clause or to compromise and accept a provision with
loose wording.
IV. MULTINATIONAL AGREEMENTS
Despite the difficulties in drafting bilateral agreements containing ef-
fective religious freedom clauses, multinational efforts at providing some
sort of international protection have continued. As a result, various multi-
national declarations, agreements, and conventions proclaim a right to
freedom of religious belief and exercise for nationals of the party states. 8'
Perhaps the most famous of these conventions is the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights of 1948, enacted by the United Nations.82 The
following articles of this convention are pertinent to the protection of re-
ligious freedom.
Article 18
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion
or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with
others and in public and private, to manifest his religion or
belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.
Article 29
2. In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall
be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law
solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect
for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just
requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare
in a democratic society.
S0 Currently, the Department of State seeks to obtain the right to hold religious
services and most-favored-nation treatment in FCN treaties. Failure to obtain a pro-
vision on religious freedom, however, will not necessarily prevent the conclusion of
an otherwise advantageous treaty. Though the United States is desirous of assuring
its nationals full religious liberty, it feels it cannot always insist on this as a strict
right. See letter from the Department of State to Senator George, supra note 15.
See also C. HYDE, supra note 4, at 704.
81 See note 19 supra.
82 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 3 U.N. GAOR, I, at 71, U.N.
Doc. A/810 (1948). W. BIsHOP, supra note 13, at 469.
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Article 30
Nothing in this declaration may be interpreted as employing
for any states, groups or persons any right to engage in any ac-
tivity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of
the rights and freedoms set forth herein.
The Covenant on Human Rights8 3 also contains a provision declaring
religious freedom to be a fundamental right. Even though these instru-
ments are not binding,8 4 they form excellent evidence of a customary
right of international law. 5
A slightly later convention on human rights, with binding 6 force
between the signatory States, is the European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 7 Article 9 deals with
freedom of religion.8 8 Although the Convention uses unusual wording
and is very expansive as to activities covered, its major importance lies
in the fact that it is a binding document. Thus, the Convention provides
evidence that a group of nations feel religious freedom is a right that must
be made the subject of international agreement on a grander scale than a
bilateral treaty. So great is its evidentiary effect that, in comparing the
force of the European Convention to that of the nonbinding Universal
Declaration, it has been said that to abandon the former for the latter
.. . would be tantamount to dropping the substance for the shadow."8 9
In 1969, a third multinational effort to codify international human
rights was undertaken by the Organization of American States. The pro-
83 Annex to G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI).
84 W. BISHOP, supra note 13, at 471.
85 Claydon, The Treaty Protection of Religious Rights; U.N. Draft Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Re-
ligion or Belief, 12 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 403, 406 (1972). Robertson, United Nations
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention on Human
Rights, 43 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 21 (1969). Indeed, one writer seems to feel that free-
dom of religion is already a fundamental international precept. A. KRISHNASWAMI,
supra note 4, at 24. This conclusion is based upon that author's Conference Room
Papers which embody his study of many practices in countries around the world.
86 See note 20 supra.
87 See note 20 supra.
88 Article 9 reads:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public
or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, prac-
tice or observance.
(2) Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only
to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society in the interest of public safety, for the protection
of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, text at 45 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 24 (1951).
89 M. Eissen, European Convention on Human Rights and the U.N. Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights: Problems of Co-Existence, 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 181, 183
(1972).
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posal was termed the American Convention on Human Rights.9 0 Protec-
tion of religious freedom is covered in Article 12.91 Also of interest in
this Convention is Article 27(2), which states that freedom of religion is
one of the rights to be especially protected against derogation. 92 The
Convention was signed by twelve States and requires eleven ratifications
to be effective. 93
The latest attempt to deal with the problem of establishing religious
freedom as an international right is the United Nations Draft Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance. 94 This instru-
ment speaks mainly to the elimination of domestic religious restrictions
within various countries.
All of these conventions and declarations provide evidence of a cus-
tomary right and general principle of international law protecting freedom
of religion. In light of several statements that the right to religious free-
dom is currently recognized in the majority of States, 95 it might be
tempting to conclude that this right represents a general principle of law
recognized by all nations. It must be realized, however, that the scope and
binding effect of multinational agreements, in their various forms, is still
open to question. The mere fact that such documents are still being con-
cluded demonstrates that the right to religious freedom is not yet estab-
lished as international custom. Further, one must not rule out the pos-
sibility that, in the future, this right could be abridged by an adverse
change of circumstances within a State.96 It is this apprehension and the
fact that the right to religious freedom is not yet accepted international
90 American Convention on Human Rights, text at 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 679 (1971).
91 Article 12 reads:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience and of religion.
This right includes freedom to maintain or to change one's religion or
beliefs, and freedom to profess or disseminate one's religion or beliefs
either individually or together with others, in public or in private.
2. No one shall be subject to restrictions that might impair his free-
dom to maintain or to change his religion or beliefs.
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion and beliefs may be subject only
to the limitations prescribed by law that are necessary to protect public
safety, order, health, or morals, or the rights of freedoms of others.
4. Parents or guardians, as the case may be, have the right to pro-
vide for the religious and moral education of their children or wards
that is in accord with their own convictions.
id.
92 Burgenthal, American Convention on Human Rights; Illusions and Hopes, 21
BUFFALO L. REV. 121, 128 (1971).
93 The United States was not a signatory. Id. at 121. Burgenthal states that Latin
America is a breeding ground for regimes opposed to human rights. Id. at 123.
94 Note by the Secretary-General, Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intoler-
ance, U.N. Doc. A/7930 (1970).
95 A. KRISHNASWAMI, supra note 4, at 24.
96 For example, it was not until 1966 that an appreciable amount of religious free-
dom was allowed in Spain. Krishnaswami, in his 1959 report, noted that there were
trends toward recognition of the right to religious freedom, but did not rule out the
unfortunate possibility of a reversal in such trends. A. KRISHNASWAMI, supra note 4,
at 81. See also Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance, 89 CHRISTIAN
CENTURY, Aug. 30, 1972, at 856.
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custom that spur the continued drive to establish freedom of religion as a
human right in the international sphere. Given this goal, the bilateral
FCN treaties concluded by the United States provide additional evidence
of religious rights at international law. With the present state of interna-
tional law clearly in mind, the specific proposals can be advanced.
V. PROPOSAL
The problem with the religious freedom treaty clauses currently used
by the United States is that they may not, in all cases, be sufficient to ful-
fill both their protective and evidentiary functions. Although the policy
behind the clauses has consistently been to favor a strong protective guar-
antee, the phraseology employed to implement this policy has sometimes
failed to convey the idea of religious freedom as a fundamental and in-
alienable right. This failure is evident when the detailed phrasing in some
past treaties is compared with the arguably less concrete language con-
tained in recent clauses. Of course, it can be argued that circumstances
have changed sufficiently that extensive and detailed freedom of religion
clauses are no longer necessary. As previously noted, this may be true
in many cases.97 However, international law must be developed to meet
unexpected contingencies and to provide protection against as many fore-
seeable difficulties as possible. While interpretative problems may increase
as wording becomes more detailed, treaty drafters should not shrink from
attempting to carve out specific rights simply because they fear that the
words may create unforeseen avenues of escape from obligations. Indeed,
avoidance of contractual duty may be easier when more general phrase-
ology is employed. It is, therefore, proposed that the United States take
the following steps, where possible, to strengthen its FCN treaty position
on the right to religious freedom.
First, where existing treaties contain wording insufficiently conveying
the idea that religious freedom is a fundamental right, the United States
should adopt a treaty protocol explicitly setting forth the fundamental
character of this right. Apparently the idea of using protocols to guarantee
religious freedom is not new. Robert Wilson has noted9" that the first of
the post-1945 treaties9 9 contained an interpretive protocol which stated
that the power to regulate a right in the treaty was not the power to take
away that right. 100 Wilson cites paragraph 2(b) of the protocol accom-
panying -the 1946 FCN treaty with China. 101 Of the pre-1957 treaties to
97 See note 4 and accompanying text, supra.
98 See Wilson, supra note 12.
99 Treaty with China on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 4, 1946, art.
XII, 63 Stat. 1299 (1949), T.I.A.S. No. 1871 (effective Nov. 30, 1943).
100 Wilson, supra note 12, at 930.
101 Paragraph 2(b) of the Protocol reads:
The words "not forbidden by the laws and regulations enforced by
the duly constituted authorities" as used in Article II, 2, [which
refers to the general rights to engage in religious activities] shall be
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which Wilson addresses himself, only the one with China has a protocol
applying to an interpretation of the breadth of religious freedom. 10 2 Wil-
son's observation is perhaps overbroad, because the provision in the pro-
tocol to the Chinese treaty seems to grant only a national treatment stan-
dard. 10 3 Therefore, while the idea of using an interpretive protocol
has been suggested before, x0 4 no real use has been made of that device.
With respect to existing treaties containing religious freedom language, a
new protocol could be used to create greater certainty regarding the na-
ture of the protected right. Such a protocol should attempt to recognize a
fundamental international right of religious freedom and could read as
follows:
The provisions of this treaty relating to the freedom of na-
tionals of either High Contracting Party to have liberty of con-
science and of religious worship are recognized by both High
Contracting Parties to be in accord with the international stan-
dard of religious freedom as expressed in the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights. Therefore, such measures as are taken
to restrict religious practices in the interest of the public health.
morals, safety or welfare shall be only those as are absolutely
necessary and shall not be undertaken to deprive anyone of his
or her fundamental right of religious freedom at international
law.
This language could be made applicable to other fundamental rights
found in the treaty or could be confined to the stated right of religious
freedom. Such a protocol would prevent -the use of egregious licensing or
regulatory requirements to restrict a religious practice that is part of a
valid ceremony or belief. This wording would also show that both States
regard religious freedom as a fundamental international right. The refer-
ence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights may facilitate agree-
ment among nations as to proper wording.
Negotiations concerning existing treaties that lack a religious freedom
clause should be treated in the same manner as any future FCN treaty
construed to mean such prohibtory laws and regulations as are ap-
plicable alike to nationals of the country and to nationals of the other
High Contracting Party.
Treaty with China on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 4, 1946, Protocol,
63 Stat. 1299 (1949), T.I.A.S. No. 1871 (effective Nov. 30, 1948).
102 In treaties subsequent to 1956, protocols dealing with this point were lacking.
103 Indeed, Wilson's next sentence seems implicity to recognize this:
If provisions are in a national or most-favored-nation treatment context,
this explanation would seem to be unnecessary when the treaties con-
tain, as all of the recent ones do, a definition of national treatment
and a definition of most-favored-nation treatment.
Wilson, supra note 12, at 930.
104 Note that Whiteman feels that Article I of .the United States-Italy treaty of
1948 declares that religious activities can not be regulated so as to destroy the entire
practice of religion under this treaty. M. WHITEMAN, supra note 10, at 400. See also
Treaty with Italy on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Feb. 2, 1948, art. I,
para. 2, & art. XI, 63 Stat. 2255 (1949). T.I.A.S. No. 1965 (effective July 26, 1949).
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that may be concluded. In all such cases, .the United States should at-
tempt to negotiate a modified freedom of religion clause. The clause
would be brief and yet still convey the fundamental aspect of this reli-
gious guarantee. The proposed clause might read as follows:
Nationals of either High Contracting Party shall enjoy, within
the territories of the other Party, freedom of conscience and
religious worship; and they shall be at liberty to hold religious
services, both' private and public, at suitable places of their
choice, which they shall be allowed to erect, maintain, and own
or to lease. The activities here mentioned shall be subject only
to regulations that are absolutely necessary for the protection
of the public health, safety, morals or welfare and such regula-
tion shall not be imposed so as to deprive anyone of his or her
fundamental right of religious freedom at international law, as
expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The initial language of the clause is based on wording contained in many
of the most recent FCN treaty provisions. Additional wording, requiring
that public regulations be based on necessity and that recognition be given
to religious freedom, is included to further the United States' expressed
policy goals. Thus, use of the proposed protocol and modified treaty
clause can further the protection of Americans abroad while serving as
evidence of a customary right and general principle of religious freedom
in international law.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has advanced means by which the United States can ad-
equately protect the religious beliefs of its nationals while strengthening
the position of religious freedom in the world. The freedom of a person
to believe or disbelieve in any supreme power and the right to follow the
dictates and practices of whatever belief he or she chooses have always
been important. These rights should be accorded legal protection because
of their close relationship to the free exercise of opinion and the expres-
sion of an implicit recognition of a force higher than the State.10 5 The
exercise of religious freedom is, therefore, a seminal right. The spectrum
of human rights is such that each right depends on the other. All are
bound together by the common thread of respect for individual dignity.
It is hoped that the creation of a right to free religious belief and practice
at international law will have the additional benefit of advancing the
cause of human rights.
-Bruce F. Howell
105 H. LAUTERPACHT, AN INTERNATIONAL BILL OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN 105 (1945).
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